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Abstract That science is fundamentally universal has been proclaimed innumer-
able times. But the precise geographical meaning of this universality has changed
historically. This article examines conceptions of scientific internationalism from
the Enlightenment to the Cold War, and their varying relations to cosmopolitanism,
nationalism, socialism, and ‘the West’. These views are confronted with recent
tendencies to cast science as a uniquely European product.
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Introduction
The idea of Europe as the ‘cradle of modern science’ is gaining popularity in
unexpected circles. Many EU enthusiasts wish to complement the process of
political and economic integration by a growing sense of a common European
culture. And some of them have embraced science as a major constituent of a shared
European heritage. Wasn’t the Scientific Revolution the product of collective
European endeavour? And isn’t modern science a uniquely European achievement,
unrivalled by historical developments in other times and places? (Lecourt 1993)1
Promoters of a European consciousness eagerly answer in the affirmative and
squarely identify science with Europe. In the words of the Crown Prince of The
Netherlands: ‘Science is an important bearer of the social and cultural identity of
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Europe that (…) distinguishes itself from other societies and earlier cultures by its
rationality’ (HRH the Prince of Orange 2006, p. 101).2
While such claims may be politically timely, historiographically they are quite
out of touch. Over the last two decades, historians of science have paid great
attention to the places where science is practiced, and have recognized the
significance of local contexts for the production of knowledge.3 But these settings
are generally of a much smaller size than Europe as a whole. Typically they range
from laboratories to places like courts, cities, and even national institutions—but
seldom to anything larger in scope. Europe is simply too big and too diverse to be a
meaningful context. As the ‘geographer of science’ David Livingstone observed, the
idea of a seamlessly European science ‘fails to take seriously enough the regional
geography of science’ (Livingstone 2003, p. 91).4
Yet, the current emphasis on local contexts is not only opposed to a European
picture, but also to the long-standing notion of science as inherently universal. In
fact, the localist perspective has developed precisely as a reaction against such
universalism: the idea that science is independent of the place where it is practiced
(because of the universality of its knowledge or method), and that scientific
practitioners are automatically united in a single global pursuit—a model of
peaceful cooperation. Already in the 1960s Brigitte Schro¨der-Gudehus offered
compelling evidence against this ideal-picture, showing that in times of interna-
tional tension, scientists have been at least as nationalist and uncooperative as
ordinary citizens (Schro¨der-Gudehus 1966, 1978). Not much later Jean-Jacques
Salomon concluded that modern science is far too wrapped up with state institutions
to transcend national interests, despite its universal epistemic basis (Salomon 1971).
In the decades that followed, studies inspired by the sociology of scientific
knowledge showed even the categories at this basis (what counts as fact? what is a
demonstration?) to be locally constituted, and the wider ‘travel’ of knowledge
became something to be explained as a material and embodied accomplishment
rather than the frictionless result of science’s inherent universality (Shapin 1995,
pp. 304–309).
But while the reality of scientific universalism has been rejected, there has been no
denial of its power as self-representation. Science may not be inherently universal, but
scientists have often viewed their enterprise in such terms. Since the Enlightenment,
the universal character of science has been proclaimed innumerable times—for
various reasons, and in a range of different contexts. And in accordance with these
varying circumstances, the meaning of the concept itself has historically changed. A
number of historians have analysed how scientific universalism has been understood in
2 For similar views see (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 2006). I am
indebted to Kostas Gavroglu for this reference.
3 Localist historiography has become so widespread that the literature is too vast to cite. General and
methodological overviews include (Ophir and Shapin 1991; Shapin 1995; Golinski 1998, Chap. 3;
Livingstone 2003).
4 The idea of a homogeneous European science has also been questioned by scholars of STEP (Science
and Technology in the European Periphery—see http://www.cc.uoa.gr/step/) while histories of colonial
settings have challenged the European boundaries of science. See, e.g. (MacLeod 2000a, 2005).
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some significant periods and contexts.5 But what is still lacking is a long-term
perspective that highlights its general historical variability. Such a perspective can
show, for example, how the rise of nationalism has affected how science was perceived
to be universal, and clarify what the term ‘inter-national’ has meant. A longue-dure´e
view may also reveal whether ‘universal’ has been simply a codeword for ‘Western’,
and how the conception of science as ‘European’ fits in the history of universalism.
This paper aims to contribute to these goals by outlining predominant notions of
scientific universalism from the late Enlightenment to the early Cold War.
The Republic of Letters
Scientific universalism found one of its most important expressions in the ideal of the
‘Republic of Letters’, a concept widely promoted by savants in the early modern
period (Goldgar 1995; Goodman 1994). The pursuit of knowledge, according to this
ideal, brought people of various creeds and countries together, and inspired a loyalty
that stood above religion, family or nation. Men of learning were supposed to form a
cosmopolitan Republic that transcended national rivalries and conflicts. Needless to
say, such rivalries did often occur in practice, but to call the Republic of Letters an
inconsequential ideal would be to underestimate its power as a shared value. Savants
did feel obliged to act in an open, cooperative manner and expected others to do
likewise. So while England and France were at war for much of the eighteenth century,
their men of science continued to share news and observations, and the Royal Society
and Acade´mie des Sciences kept electing honorary members across the Channel.
Leaders of overseas expeditions, like Thomas Cook and Alexandre Guy Pingre´, even
received assistance from ‘enemy’ navy officers. That science was supposed to rise
above war and international conflict was even recognized on the battlefield itself.6
Whether the Republic of Letters was seen as a ‘European’ community has proved
hard to analyse. It is true that most of its members lived in Europe, but Americans
like Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson were certainly included—also after
their country ceased to be a colony of Britain. Women, Jews, and members of other
religious minorities were routinely excluded, but at the same time natives of
Morocco and Libya could be elected Fellows of the Royal Society, even though this
did not necessarily merit them savant status.7 The Republic was certainly not as
‘open to everybody’ as its promoters would have it, but it seems that until the
general rise of the nation-state, exclusion followed the lines of religion and social
standing rather than nationality (Goldgar 1995, pp. 3–7; Daston 1991; Shapin 1998/
1999). Perhaps the most precise statement would be that the Republic of Letters
5 Apart from both books by Schro¨der-Gudehus (1966, 1978): (Forman 1973; Daston 1990; Crawford
et al. 1993; Widmalm 1995; Otterspeer and Schuller tot Peursum-Meijer 1997; Metzler 2000; Krige and
Barth 2006).
6 The classical but contested work on this is (de Beer 1960). See also (Daston 1990, p. 98; Crosland
1995).
7 Mohammed Ben Ali Abgali, ambassador of the emperor of Morocco (elected 1726), and Cassem
Algiada Aga, ambassador of the kingdom of Tripoli (elected 1728), were among several non-European
Fellows within Britain. On British Fellows overseas, see (Home 2002).
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coincided with ‘the civilized world’, which in practice excluded most non-western
parts of the globe, but in principle was geographically inclusive.
Scientific Nationalism
A major change in the cosmopolitanism expressed in the ideal of the Republic of
Letters occurred during the late eighteenth century. After the French Revolution,
patriotic values began to be associated with the pursuit of knowledge. Whereas the
fruits of science used to be reaped by all of humanity, during the Napoleonic
consulate and empire, its accomplishments were increasingly presented in terms of
national prestige (Daston 1990). The emperor himself designed medals, ceremonies,
and even uniforms for savants whose achievements added to their own fame as well
as to that of their nation’s. The Institut National repeatedly trumpeted ‘la gloire de
la patrie’, emphasizing France’s scientific superiority, and hence also justifying the
lootings of natural history collections in occupied regions. Military victory was
linked to scientific success. Learned men in other countries reacted with disapproval
to the sudden change of values, or were sometimes simply surprised—like Joseph
Banks, who had pleaded for the release of an imprisoned French naturalist qua
naturalist, and was thanked for his support of the French national cause (Daston
1990, pp. 99–101). In the course of the nineteenth century, however, these
reservations ceded, and science was increasingly combined with nationalism, also
outside of France.8
Scientific nationalism developed most dramatically in the German states after
1815. From its incipience, German nationalism was built on the notion of a common
Kultur, of which Wissenschaft was an important part.9 Although practitioners of the
humanities (Geisteswissenschaftler) were generally seen as the prime bearers of this
culture, their colleagues in the natural sciences aspired to be regarded similarly, and
with some success. The Gesellschaft Deutscher Naturforscher und A¨rzte (GDNA¨,
Association of German Scientists and Physicians) was known as a symbol and
advocate of a united German nation when that nation was still politically divided
over many principalities. Liberal scientists like Hermann Helmholtz, Karl Ludwig,
and the young Emil Du Bois-Reymond supported the 1848 Revolution and the
‘Professors’ Parliament’ in Frankfurt, which aimed at a single unified nation-state.
Their belief in the fundamental unity of science was closely related to their
aspirations for national unity, and when this was finally achieved under Bismarck,
these sentiments did not fade (Galison forthcoming).10 By the late nineteenth
century, Wissenschaft was still seen as a crucial component of German culture, and
advancements made by German scientists were regarded as reflecting the greatness
of the nation—just like economic and military achievements did (McCormach 1974;
Daston 1998, pp. 72–73). Not only had the material role of science in the country’s
8 On subsequent developments of scientific nationalism in France, see (Fell 2002). The volume in which
this article appeared offers an excellent overview of the historiography of scientific nationalism. See
especially the editors’ introduction (Jessen and Vogel 2002).
9 On German science and nation-building, see (Lenoir 1997; Cahan 1989; Johnson 1990).
10 On the more radical Rudolf Virchow, who would dissent under Bismarck, see (Goschler 2002).
364 G. J. Somsen
123
industry and armed forces increased, also ideologically science was increasingly
associated with Germany’s national strength.
Scientific nationalism also prospered in other countries. In 1830, Charles
Babbage looked with envy to the French patriotic support of science when he wrote
his Reflections on the Decline of Science in England (Daston 1990, p. 112). Later in
the century, the good of the nation and the British Empire became common themes
in public projections of the value of science (Turner 1980).11 Even though
‘Englishness’ continued to be associated with a liberal-humanist education, natural
scientists proclaimed that they could edify the nation just as well, or even better.12
In Hungary, where Magyar nationalism was officially accepted after 1867, scientific
achievements were fully integrated into the glorified national heritage.13 And even a
small country like the Netherlands developed a late but full-fledged version of
scientific nationalism. Not only was the celebrated work of H. A. Lorentz and J. H.
van ‘t Hoff described as typical ‘physics of the fatherland’ and specifically ‘Dutch
chemistry’, but the whole blossoming period of Dutch science around 1900 was
understood in nationalist terms (van Lunteren 2004; Oosterhoff 1984; van Deventer
1887). It was called ‘the Second Golden Age’ as if it were a repetition of the first
‘Golden Age’ of the seventeenth century, the nation’s alleged Gru¨nderzeit (van
Berkel 1998, pp. 149–150). Speakers at the Nederlandsch Natuur- en Geneeskundig
Congres (Netherlands Scientific and Medical Congress), a Dutch version of the
GDNA¨, even claimed that the national character (dispassionate, patient, precise and
persevering) made Dutchmen exceptionally well-suited for scientific work. Here
scientific achievement was not only described, but also explained in nationalist
terms (Visser 1991).14
Olympic Internationalism
Yet, while scientific nationalism became widespread by the turn of the twentieth
century, the supranational qualities of science did not cease to be stressed. What
used to be the cosmopolitan Republic of Letters now became ‘the international
scientific community’, with a shift in meaning from a brotherhood of individuals to
an association of nations. But the peace-promoting effects of the scientific
community continued to be emphasized, and its territory was still identified with
‘the civilized world’, or with ‘Christendom’, even in nonreligious meanings. For
secularist writers like Andrew Dickson White and Thorstein Veblen, Christendom
was the space once dominated by Christianity, and now the domain of modern
civilization where science reigned supremely (White 1893; Veblen 1918).
11 See also several of the essays in (MacLeod 1996, 2000b).
12 E.g. (Hill 1937). See further (Mayer 2000a, b).
13 Any walk through the statue-laden city of Budapest can testify to this.
14 In a similar vein, contemporaries like Pierre Duhem and J. T. Merz argued that different nations have
different styles in science. This theme of national styles has persisted, but current analysts like Jonathan
Harwood explain them in institutional terms rather than on the basis of national character. See e.g.
(Harwood 1987).
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At the same time, the international scientific community was increasingly
institutionalized, first in the novelty of the international conference, and later in a
growing number of international unions in specific scientific disciplines. No less
than twenty three scientific unions were founded between 1860 and 1899, when the
International Association of Academies was created to top them all (Speeckaert
1957, p. xiii; Rasmussen 1990; Schroeder-Gudehus 1990). So rapid was the
multiplication of international institutions that catalogues were written to keep track
of the fervent development, which was itself sometimes called l’internationalisme
scientifique (e.g. Eijkman 1910, 1911; Speeckaert 1957).
It may at first appear paradoxical that this growth in the international
organization of science occurred simultaneously with scientific nationalism, but
in fact the two went hand in hand (Schroeder-Gudehus 1966, pp. 41–62; Forman
1973; Metzler 2000, pp. 33–83). While the new institutions were presented as
vehicles for international cooperation, they were also meant to assess and
acknowledge national scientific accomplishments. National achievements, after
all, can only be measured by international standards, so some form of international
organization was required for them to be recognized at all. Paul Forman has aptly
compared this situation to the practice of the Olympic Games, which are supposed
to advance both international fraternization and national victory and pride—see the
national hymns and flags at the winners’ podium (Forman 1973, p. 154). Likewise in
science around 1900, international competition served to demonstrate national
accomplishment and, at the same time, international brotherhood and national
triumphs were celebrated. Scientific internationalism was not a counterforce to
nationalism, but effectively channelled and facilitated it.
The First World War gravely upset international relations in science, yet it did
not destroy the Olympic model through which those relations were generally
perceived.15 Shortly after the outbreak of the War, 93 prominent German
intellectuals signed a manifesto An die Kulturwelt! (To the Civilized World!), in
which they declared loyalty to their country and tried to justify its military actions
(von Ungern-Sternberg and von Ungern-Sternberg 1996).16 Among the signers were
many important academics, including active promoters of international cooperation,
like Wilhelm Ostwald. But their patriotism was not the result of a sudden reversal of
values (Schroeder-Gudehus 1990, pp. 137–138). It had been part and parcel of an
internationalism that already included passionate forms of nationalism, and that
regarded scientific achievement as a manifestation of national greatness, compa-
rable to military success.
This is not to say that scientists across the frontlines appreciated the patriotic
declaration. Very soon after the manifesto appeared, several English and French
scholars published dismissive responses to the German professors. Their objection
was not that their counterparts ‘across the Rhine’ had expressed loyalty to their
country—the British and French felt a similar urge to serve their nations. What
15 Much has been written on the rift in international relations in science during and after the First World
War. See (Schroeder-Gudehus 1966; Widmalm 1995; Otterspeer and Schuller tot Peursum-Meijer 1997;
Metzler 2000; Kevles 1971; Grau 2000; MacLeod 2000c).
16 The Aufruf’s authors actually defended their case by appealing to internationalist values.
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upset them was that German nationalism seemed to be violating the norms of
international conduct—quite literally, because the German armies were thought to
have broken international laws of warfare. The manifesto had denied this, just as
it had denied a whole series of alleged war crimes that were taken as established
facts on the Allied side—the wilful destruction of the university library of
Louvain, for example. In Allied eyes, this explicit denial of fact demonstrated that
the German scientists were even willing to sacrifice truth for their overwhelming
nationalism, and hence destroy their own credibility. The Germans saw this
differently, and were in turn disturbed by the arrogant chauvinism of Allied
scientists (Otterspeer and Schuller tot Peursum-Meijer 1997, pp. 23–25). Only a
few, such as Albert Einstein, rejected nationalism altogether (Nicolai et al. 1996).
Most adhered to Olympic internationalism, which gave room for patriotism if kept
within the limits of proper international conduct. Their accusation was not that
their counterparts played the Olympic game, but that they tried to win it by
breaking the rules.
These perceptions persisted after the war, creating a situation of long-lasting
gridlock. Scientists from Allied nations, especially France and Belgium, felt that
the Germans had so deeply violated the norms of international relations (in
science as on the battlefield), that it was impossible to resume cooperation.
Accordingly, German scientists were banned from international unions and from
the International Research Council (IRC), the new all-encompassing organization,
set up around the time of the Treaty of Versailles (Kevles 1971). Many German
scientists felt that their Allied colleagues were abusing military victory to
dominate the scientific world, which was not a far-fetched idea since the IRC
came directly out of the Inter-Allied Research Council, an organization created
during the war for military purposes (Kevles 1971, pp. 51–57).17 But after years
of protracted discussions, the IRC decided to stop the exclusion of German
scientists and, in 1926, invited Germany to join as a member. The Germans,
however, declined. One reason was the way in which the IRC had worded their
invitation. As Fritz Haber explained,
We know very well that we have lost the war and that both politically and
economically we no longer belong to the leaders of the world. But
scientifically we still believe to be among the nations that can claim a
leading position. Whether this claim is acknowledged is hard to tell from an
invitation of the same form as that which has been sent to Siam.18
For Haber, national greatness could be manifested in military, economic or
scientific ways, and the point of international organizations was to recognize such
greatness. This is where the IRC had failed, because it had treated Germany
similarly to Siam. Despite the war and its troublesome aftermath, scientific
internationalism was still conceived in terms of the Olympic model.
17 Moreover, delegates to the IRC were appointed by their respective governments, and the number of
national representatives depended on the size of a country’s population rather than its scientific merit. See
(Jones 1960, p. 171).
18 Quoted in Otterspeer and Schuller tot Peursum-Meijer (1997, p. 162) (my translation).
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Socialist Internationalism
Yet the Olympic model would fade. What made it give way was not the war and the
tensions it created. It was the rise between the two world wars of a wholly different
kind of scientific internationalism—one that espoused a different relation between
science and nationalism and a different role of science in the world.
Some of this change was foreshadowed before the Great War by the Belgian
scientist and historian of science George Sarton. Sarton was not opposed to
nationalism per se, but he believed that what was important about science was not its
national, but its international base. No discovery was ever made in isolation, and no
nation made any significant advance without contributions from others. Science was
an activity of mankind as a whole, and that unique universality made it the backbone
of civilization (Theunissen forthcoming; Thackray and Merton 1972). Sarton founded
the journal Isis with the explicit aim of demonstrating and celebrating this
fundamentally international character. ‘But Alas!’, he wrote in the first issue,
If science is in essence international, sometimes scientists are not. Too often,
the generosity which science should confer to them, is suffocated by their
chauvinist and nationalist tendencies. Isis will work in the other direction,
underlining the lessons of tolerance and wisdom that history teaches so
abundantly; Isis will denounce on every possible occasion the imperialist
tendencies that some scientists try to impose on the science of their country or
of their race. (Sarton 1913, p. 44)19
What Sarton tried to show was the global nature of scientific endeavour. The
early issues of Isis not only presented articles on Paracelsus and ‘Three English men
of science’, but also on Hindu geometry, Arab mineralogy, and Japanese algebra
(e.g. Whetham and Whetham 1913; Smith 1913; Ruska 1913; Mikami 1914). In this
effort, Sarton was later joined by scientist-historians like Joseph Needham and J.D.
Bernal, who regarded science as a human faculty that was present in all
civilizations. Science, in Needham’s words, was not Western but ‘ecumenical’,
flowing from sources all over the globe into one great river of truth (Bray 1996; Low
1998, pp. 1–2).20 His, as well as Bernal’s and Sarton’s accounts were not national or
European, but ‘world histories’ of science.
Another major turn away from Olympic internationalism was instigated by the
English writer H. G. Wells. Wells was famous not only for his science fiction, but
also for his political commentaries, in which science played an equally central role.
In Wells’ view, the evils of his day (from social injustice to world war) were the
result of a lack of scientific knowledge among the general public and the leaders of
government. Since people were hardly ever taught objective facts about the world,
but instead indoctrinated by teachings like nationalist history, it was no wonder that
catastrophes such as the Great War occurred. Wells hoped that in the course of time
19 Sarton (1919) rejected cosmopolitanism, stressing that he preferred an internationalism that
presupposed strong nations. On the whole, however, he emphasized the international and internation-
alizing, rather than the national, character of science.
20 The global perspective is continued in (McClellan and Dorn 1999).
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education would become scientific, and a scientific mentality would begin to guide
politics. The current system of nation states would then be dispensed with and
mankind would move toward a global society. In the ‘World State’ which Wells
vehemently promoted, scientific procedures would direct government and divisions
between nations would no longer exist (Partington 2003; de Wilde and Somsen
forthcoming). For Wells, the progress of science was directly coupled to the regress
of nationalism, and in this his internationalism markedly differed from the Olympic
model. Literally speaking, Wells’ version was not even ‘inter-national’ anymore,
but generally cosmopolitan.
In the 1930s, Wells’ ideals of scientific government and international integration
were also adopted by what has become known as ‘the scientific Left’ in Britain.21
Communist scientists like Bernal, Needham, and J. B. S. Haldane, and more
moderate reformers such as Julian Huxley proclaimed that scientific planning could
solve society’s problems much better than regular politics. For them, science was
not just the study of nature, but a general attitude and way of thinking that formed a
reasonable guide in any political area, including international affairs. Most of them
regarded socialism very similarly: as a rational approach to society. Not all went as
far as Bernal, who claimed that essentially science is communism, and that therefore
the Soviet Union was the model of a scientific society (Bernal 1939, p. 415). But
most left-wing scientists did agree that science and socialism shared their most
important values: the relief of human misery, transcendence of nation and class,
progressivism, internationalism.
While leftist views soon dominated British discourse on science, similar
developments took place in the U.S., France, the Netherlands, and even Republican
Spain (Kuznick 1987; Bensaude-Vincent 1987; Petitjean (unpublished paper);
Salmo´n and Huertas forthcoming; Somsen 2001). The internationalist movement
became international, and gained coherence with the rise of a common enemy in
Nazi Germany. Many left-wing scientists regarded national socialism as not only
politically objectionable, but also deeply at odds with the values of science—a view
that they saw confirmed by the Nazis’ expulsion of Jewish scientists. When this
wave of refugees arrived in Western Europe and the U.S., feelings of solidarity were
further enhanced, and scientific internationalism seemed more urgent than ever
(Koch and Platt 1993).
How the notion of internationalism had changed with respect to its earlier
incarnations can be seen in the official resolutions of the International Council of
Scientific Unions (ICSU), the successor to the IRC. In 1934 and 1937, the ICSU
adopted two proposals from the socialist-dominated Amsterdam Academy of
Sciences, the second carrying signatures of left-wing scientists from all over the
world.22 Both proposals were responses to the tensions created by Nazi Germany,
and called upon the ‘brotherhood of scientists’ to maintain international relations
21 The term is from (Werskey 1988). See also (Werskey 1971; McGucken 1984).
22 ‘Proposal by the Royal Academy of Sciences, Amsterdam,’ in Lyons (1935, pp. 16–17); Untitled
resolution, in (Stratton 1937, p. 17). The signatures were given to a separate document, accompanying the
latter proposal: ‘Memorandum Concerning a Proposal for the Appointment of a Committee for
Investigating the Social Responsibilities of Science’, National Archives of North-Holland (Haarlem), files
of the Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen, 64, entry 455.
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and keep exemplifying peaceful cooperation. In itself such an appeal was hardly
new, yet the way in which it was framed differed from older forms of
internationalism. While in the Olympic model, science reflected the greatness of
a nation, now it was presented as an antidote to nationalist sentiments. Both
proposals warned against excessive nationalism and associated it with tribal
instincts, ‘unsound creeds and prejudices’, and barbarism. Also, the perception of
science-military relations was different. Whereas in the Olympic model, military
power was on a par with scientific achievement, now their values were diametrically
opposed. If science stood for argument and reason, militarism meant authority and
brute force. Hence,
The old historical tendency which considered the military and the naval
organization as the most important factor of a nation and as the prime
expression of its force, should nowhere find support among scientific workers,
as it is contrary to our present idea of cultural advance.23
Most fundamentally, the conception of science itself had changed. In the
Olympic framework, science was viewed as a cultural good, comparable to
philosophy or art. In the socialist scheme of things, science was primarily presented
as an instrument to solve the problems of society. Both ICSU proposals spoke
extensively about pressing economic and social issues, and presented science as
their ultimate solution, if only it could be organized internationally.
Science and World Order
The Second World War silenced socialist internationalism on the continent, but it
survived and thrived in the UK. Scientific research became part of the British war
effort, and left-wing scientists proclaimed that this form of intensive use of science
(especially for civil purposes) should continue to exist in peacetime.24 The British
Association for the Advancement of Science organized a series of conferences
promoting scientific approaches to social problems, the largest of which took the
subject to a global scale. ‘Science and World Order’ was a high-profile meeting with
enormous press-coverage, where hundreds of British scientists, Nazi-refugees,
politicians, and foreign diplomats discussed how to build a new society after the war
with the aid of scientific methods and in keeping with scientific values (‘Science and
World Order’ 1942). One of the main topics was scientific internationalism, a
subject that, according to a conference report, could have been taken for granted had
it not been threatened by Nazi Germany. The Nazis had not only expelled Jewish
scientists, but even denied the internationality of science and introduced the idea of
an exclusively Aryan physics. True science, the report stated, could not do
23 ‘Memorandum Concerning a Proposal for the Appointment of a Committee for Investigating the
Social Responsibilities of Science’, National Archives of North-Holland (Haarlem), files of the
Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen, 64, entry 455, p. 4.
24 For a compelling critique of this rhetoric, see (Edgerton 1966).
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otherwise than condemn such nationalist perversions (Crowther et al. 1942, pp.
129–138).
Aryan physics in fact never gained much ground in Nazi Germany, but it did
become an important resource for Allied war propaganda. The journal Nature
condemned it from the start, and Robert Merton used it as a counterexample against
which he formulated his norms of science (Hollinger 1983).25 Aryan chauvinism
was contrasted with scientific universalism, and the Nazis’ ideological travesty of
physics helped to stage ‘free science’ as a natural ally of democracy (e.g. ‘Science
and World Order’ 1942, pp. 115–116). These associations delivered another blow to
scientific nationalism, which now was not only rejected by socialist scientists, but
became a potentially suspect position for anybody in the West. The conception of
science as the proud production of a nation so closely resembled the Blut und Boden
idea of Aryan physics, that Western scientists could hardly profess it any longer in
its old, bombastic manner. National pride in science did not disappear with the
Second World War, but its expression now had to avoid resemblance to the Nazi
belief-system. In a 1941 war pamphlet, Julian Huxley denounced the University of
Heidelberg’s inscription ‘To the German Spirit’ as a sign of perverted science. What
had been liberal and progressive one century earlier was now associated with
reactionary evil (Huxley 1941, p. 20).
Science as European
Socialist scientists dominated much of the public discussion of science up to and
during the Second World War, but their conception of scientific internationalism
was not the only one around. In the same period, other views were voiced, some of
which presented science as an explicitly European endeavour. Already during the
Great War, for example, Einstein had co-authored a ‘Manifesto to the Europeans’,
which portrayed science as a major constituent of a comprehensively European
civilization. Scientists should retain their loyalty to this common culture and,
Einstein warned, not lapse into antagonistic nationalisms (Nicolai et al. 1996). The
French intellectual, Julien Benda, voiced a similar view in his Discourse a` la Nation
Europe´enne (Address to the European Nation) in 1933. Benda distinguished two
European intellectual traditions. One was rooted in German romanticism and
expressed itself in heroic art. This tradition stressed the uniqueness of national
cultures and led to disunity and strife. The other was the tradition of Greek and
French rationalism, that flourished in modern science and united people through its
supranational character. The Europe that Benda preferred, Francophile despite
himself, was based on the latter, ‘scientific’ tradition (Benda 1933).
Both Einstein and Benda explicitly identified science with Europe, but they
did so in order to reject nationalist perspectives rather than a more global vision.
What they attributed to science were anti-nationalist and internationalist qualities,
and in this sense their views were not far removed from those of the socialist
25 Universalism was one of Merton’s norms.
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internationalists. Their association of science with Europe was opposed to the level
of nations instead of to the level of the world as a whole.
A turn towards a European conception of science that was decidedly not global
took place in the historiography of science during the early post-war years, and
this turn was an explicit reaction against the prevailing socialist-internationalist
ideas. Socialist scientists, when they took to writing history, tended to take a
global perspective, not viewing science as the product of a particular civilization,
but as a human faculty common to all societies from prehistory onwards (e.g.
Bernal 1986, pp. 65–89). This view corresponded with the socialist conception of
science not as a particular cultural product, but as a universal instrument to solve
practical problems.
A new generation of historians of science argued against this socialist-
internationalist conception. For Herbert Butterfield and Alexandre Koyre´, the
socialist view reduced science to mere technology, ignoring the intellectual
dimensions that were at the core of scientific endeavour. In their view, the history of
science was to become a history of ideas. According to Koyre´, great scientific
innovations were ‘made not by engineers and craftsmen, but by men who seldom
built or made anything more real than a theory’ (Koyre´ 1989, p. 121).26 The key
defining moment in this new intellectual history of science was the Scientific
Revolution—a new concept that soon became the major focus in the historiography
of science (Butterfield 1949, p. viii).27 The theoretical transformations of sixteenth
and seventeenth century astronomy and mechanics came to count as the pivotal
developments that created not just modern science, but modernity itself. Achieve-
ments in medieval physics, which Pierre Duhem had proposed as equally
revolutionary, were now reduced to ‘preparations’. Developments in eighteenth
and nineteenth-century chemistry and biology became ‘postponed’ elaborations.
Prehistory and twentieth century science all but disappeared from view.
This chronological restriction was accompanied by a geographical constraint.
The dismissal of the Middle Ages entailed a neglect of the many Islamic scholars of
this period. It also resulted in the exclusion of the most important scientific
developments in China, which were taken to have occurred before 1600. At the
same time, the treatment of eighteenth and nineteenth century achievements as
derivative reduced interest in Russia, the U.S. and Japan. A glance at the
protagonists in Koyre´’s From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (1957)
reveals an entirely European cast, and the same is true for the main figures in
Butterfield’s The Origins of Modern Science (1949) (Koyre´ 1957; Butterfield 1949).
Butterfield did devote one chapter to what he called ‘Universal History’, borrowing
Ranke’s term, in which he took a step back in order to assess the place of his events
within the whole history of mankind. But this brief historical excursion beyond
early modern Europe only served to legitimate the relevance of his chronological
and geographical priorities.
26 For similar objections, see (Koyre´ 1957, p. vii).
27 On the invention of the Scientific Revolution, see (Cunningham and Williams 1993). On Butterfield:
(Jardine 2003). See also (Shapin 1992, pp. 340–342).
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The scientific revolution we must regard (…) as a creative product of the
West—depending on a complicated set of conditions which existed only in
Western Europe. (Butterfield 1949, p. 139)
The view of science as a uniquely European product quickly eclipsed the socialist
conception. Historians like A. Rupert Hall and Charles Gillispie endorsed it in their
influential work, the latter combining it with swipes at ‘the East’, which had not
produced modern science and could not be entrusted with its atomic products (Hall
1954; Gillispie 1960, p. 9).28 Such views were further sustained through the
professionalization of the history of science in the first post-war decades. Many of
the authors just mentioned were the occupants of the first professorial chairs in the
field, established at leading universities such as Princeton, Cambridge, and Paris.
From there, the European view came to be the standard in historical teaching and
research.
But the shift away from socialist views of science was also encouraged by the
political climate (Werskey 1988, pp. 281–289; McGucken 1978). With the onset of
the Cold War, socialist ideals of scientific government and planning quickly became
associated with coercion and totalitarianism. Bernal’s admiration of the Soviet
Union put him increasingly on the political fringe. Meanwhile attacks on German
ideological physics backfired against left-wing scientists after the Lysenko affair:
now ideological perversions were featured in socialism as well (Jones 1979). This
shift of political fortunes was clearly visible in the philosophy of science. In the
United States, intense left-wing political engagement gave way to a conception of
the field as completely depoliticized—a transformation that was partly effected by
McCarthyite intimidations (Reisch 2005).29 Developments in the history of science
followed a similar path, for example in the History of Science Committee which
established the first position in the field at Cambridge University. Initiated by
Needham and friends in 1936, the committee became dominated by anti-Marxists in
subsequent years, and eventually appointed Rupert Hall. The orientation of the field
that resulted from this switch was decidedly anti-socialist. Links with social and
economic history were severed, relations to the (newly depoliticized) philosophy of
science were reinforced, and modern science was presented as the product of a
single revolution—mankind needed no more.30 In the same process, science was
reconceptualized from a global endeavour to a European production.
Finally, the European conception of science also spread beyond the disciplinary
boundaries of the history of science. It was adopted in many general history
textbooks, often designed for ‘Western Civilization’ courses, standard in American
university curricula. And while the historiography of science continued to develop
28 Interestingly, this historiography was combined with remnants of the global outlook to produce a vast
body of work on the question of why the Scientific Revolution had occurred first in Europe. Joseph
Needham’s post-war studies are early examples of this tradition; a recent synthesis of it is (Huff 1993).
29 The Cold War also evoked alternative responses. After the atomic bomb, many scientists called for
sharing its knowledge internationally. This response, partly rooted in socialist views, developed into new
expressions of internationalism in the volume One World or None, the Einstein-Russell manifesto, and the
Pugwash conferences. See (Boyer 1985).
30 See (Mayer 2000a, b), and, on the political implications, (Mayer 2004).
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after 1960, going through changes from the Kuhnian revolution to the ‘local turn’, in
these general texts, the early Cold War view proved remarkably persistent. My own
copy of Palmer and Colton’s History of the Modern World (8th edn., 1995) contains
one chapter devoted to science, which indeed covers the Scientific Revolution, and
draws mainly upon the ‘older but still valuable’ works of Koyre´, Butterfield, and
Rupert Hall. Newer social histories of science are labelled ‘provocative studies’ and
one of the most cogent critiques of the intellectualist tradition, Leviathan and the
Air-pump, appears under the history of technology (Palmer and Colton 1995, p.
1136). It is this enduring widespread adaptation that makes the notion of science as
European, despite fundamental and continued challenges, still so common and
recognizable today—and available to Euro-enthusiasts like the Crown Prince of the
Netherlands.31
Conclusion
In a recent essay, Lorraine Daston has argued that a main function of the history of
science since the Enlightenment has been ‘European self-portraiture’ (Daston 2006).
It is instructive to see whether the changing (historical and non-historical)
conceptions of science reviewed in this article fit her general picture. Some
qualifications can be made. It may be asked whether in the eighteenth century,
science was always portrayed as European, rather than ‘Western’ or belonging to
‘the civilized world’. And it could be added that in the nineteenth century, national
self-portraiture was at least as important a function of discourse on science. But
besides these minor border disputes, it seems that the general contours of the several
maps of science outlined here do coincide with Daston’s. Since the Enlightenment,
science has been associated with modernity, and modernity with ‘civilization’,
‘Christendom’, and ‘Europe’. Even during times when science was strongly
identified with nationhood, it was still understood that non-European nations (apart
from the US and some others) were of second rate importance, as was evident in
Fritz Haber’s remark about Siam.
There are, however, two main exceptions. The identification of science with
Europe was not made by the socialist internationalists of the 1920s through 1940s,
and is also refuted by today’s localist historiography—as Daston herself indicates
(Daston 2006, p. 532). For the latter reason, it is alarming that the conception of
science as European is so enthusiastically embraced by current EU promoters. It is
alarming, not because that conception is wrong (it is hard to speak about right and
wrong geographical delineations after reviewing so many of them), nor just because
it is outmoded, but because it carries with it the political overtones of the colonial
era as well as the Cold War. What was once crafted to legitimize European
imperialism and later enhanced to combat socialist worldviews is now being
presented as part of a shared European culture. But it should not be accepted as
such. Our times of globalization and intensifying cultural encounters are different
31 Prince Willem-Alexander has a university degree in history.
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than those that gave rise to the European picture—and they ask for a different
history and geography of science.
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